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This article considers the main conclusions of theSALS working group report “New Town and VillageGreens – Proposals for Reform”, and my aim in writing
it is to set a historical and jurisprudential context for
discussion of the following questions:
1. What are the nature, purpose and implications of the
current provisions for registration of new TVGs?
2. Is it necessary and/or desirable to continue to register
new TVGs?
3. If it is, how might the law and the system of registering
new TVGs be clarified and improved?
4. Are the provisions for amendment of TVG registers
adequate? If not, how might they be improved?
HISTORY OF TVG LAW
The background and nature of the Commons
Registration Act 1965 (“the 1965 Act”) were summarised
in the judgment of Carnwath J (as he then was) in R v
Suffolk County Council, ex parte Steed (1995) 70 P&CR 487 at
489–494. He noted that the Act was passed in response to
some of the recommendations of the Jennings Report
(1958) and that, as explained by the Minister, its “simple
purpose” was to “create the machinery for establishing the
facts by registration. … Until the facts are recorded it
would be premature to frame the further legislation that
will be required”
Carnwath J also commented on the threefold definition
of TVG in the Act :
(a) land which has been allotted by or under any Act for the
exercise or recreation of the inhabitants of any locality;
(b) or on which the inhabitants of any locality have a
customary right to indulge in lawful sports and
pastimes;
(c) or on which the inhabitants of any locality have
indulged in such sports and pastimes as of right for not
less than 20 years.
He observed that Class (c) “corresponds to the normal
legal understanding of a TVG, as one whose status is
derived from custom” (at p.491, referring to Hammerton v
Honey (1876) 24 WR 603 in which Sir George Jessell MR
said:
“There are certain rights which may be claimed by custom, as
distinct from prescription. What is called a right of recreation
and amusement, of air and exercise, or the playing of all
manner of lawful games and pastimes, is a right in the nature
of an easement which may well be claimed by custom,”
custom being “local law because it is the law of a particular
place as distinguished form the general common law”).
Class (c), however, he said, was novel, in that it treated
20 years use as conclusive, “whether or not there is
evidence of a modern origin”. “Unfortunately” he added
“the Act does not indicate what legal consequences, if any,
are to follow registration of such a 20-year-green.” Other
judges have noted this last point (see eg Re Turnworth Down
[1978] Ch 251, 260–1 Oliver J; New Windsor Corporation v
Mellor [1975] 1 Ch 380, Lord Denning MR: “I hope
another statute will not be long delayed”; Corpus Christi
College, Oxford v Gloucestershire CC [1983] 1 QB 360 at 378H,
Oliver LJ: “This Act … is crying out for amendment”).
Carnwath J, referring to the economic and social
implications of Steed, joined his voice to the chorus,
expressing the wish:
“It may be that this case will help to underline the
continuing need to address the problems arising from this
legislative scheme, which was half begun 30 years ago, but
never completed”.
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In December 2002 the Planning and Environmental Law Reform Working Group of the
Society for Advanced Legal Studies published a paper entitled “New Town and Village Greens –
Proposals for Reform”. It was prompted by the practical concerns of those of us in the group
who are lucky enough to find ourselves practising in this curious area of law and by a desire
to contribute to the debate on the general subject of common land and town and village
greens (TVGs) initiated by Michael Meacher MP and DEFRA in 2000 (Consultation on Greater
Protection and Better Management of Common Land in England and Wales, DEFRA, February
2000).
Pill LJ in the Court of Appeal in Steed said:
“The central difficulty about construing the Act is in
considering whether it was intended merely or primarily to
provide a mechanism for registering rights or whether it has
the potential to destroy existing rights and permit the creation
of new rights”
That question did not fall to be determined, but Pill LJ
considered it at length, stating:
“I find it difficult to conclude other than that Parliament
intended, in section 22, to open the way to the creation of
new rights … The land is a town green by virtue of statute
and, once it is a town green, should bear the same incident as
any other town green. It is the relevant use which, under statute,
creates the right but once it is registered under section 13,
section 10 provides that registration shall be conclusive of the
matters registered.” (1996) 75 P&CR 102 at 106 and 115).
The SALS paper explored some of the implications of
this view and I shall return to them later in this article.
It must be in everyone’s interests to resolve these issues
before the Act reaches its fortieth anniversary in a couple
of years’ time. This is not simply due to a desire for
legislative tidiness, but because the fundamental
uncertainty about the nature of Class C rights is of great
practical significance to landowners and communities. For
example, there is no authority on the status of land in
respect of which an application has been made but not yet
determined. If the 1965 Act created no new rights and
really was confined to regulating registration then a
landowner will be able to defeat a claim by getting on and
building in spite of the application. So far this proposition
has not been tested, possibly because of fear of bad
publicity and uncertainty on the part of developers.
(Imagine investing heavily in starting to develop a site only
to be faced by an interim injunction).
It is unclear whether or not building in these
circumstances would constitute a criminal offence or a civil
wrong or both and, in any event, whether it must be the
local authority who brings the matter to court or whether
local residents can. As we pointed out in the SALS paper,
it is not even clear whether the regulatory legislation
applies to Class C greens once registered.
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Steed was, of
course, disapproved by the House of Lords in R v Oxfordshire
County Council, ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council [1999] 3
WLR 160. In deciding that the words “as of right” in the
Act meant nothing more than the familiar test for
prescription (Nec vi, nec clam, nec precario: not by force, nor
stealth, nor the licence of the owner), their Lordships
emancipated Class C greens from the shackles of
customary law to begin a life of their own, founded upon
20th century lifestyles – mobile, and focused upon the
individual or his immediate family group, rather than a
wider community. They have appeared in some surprising
places :applications have been made in relation to, amongst
other things, beaches, school playing fields, rugby pitches
and woods – anywhere, apparently, that 20th century man
walked his dog. They also left unanswered a number of
difficult questions, some of which have already been
considered in the spate of applications which followed the
decision in Sunningwell and its widespread dissemination.
The impetus which this decision has given to the making
of applications enhances the desirability of legislative
clarification. Sunningwell was decided in late June 1999.
One of the issues which was touched on but not fully
considered in the speech of Lord Hoffmann was that of
locality. Lord Hoffman said that he was “willing to assume,
without deciding, that the user should be similar to that
which would have established a custom”, adding that he
thought it “sufficient that the land is used predominantly
by inhabitants of the village” (at pp172G–173A).
At the end of November 2000 the Countryside and
Rights of Way Act (“CROW”) was passed. Section 98
CROW amended the 1965 Act’s definition of TVG to
provide:
“(1A) Land falls within this subsection if it is land on which
for not less than twenty years a significant number of
the inhabitants of any locality or of any
neighbourhood within a locality have indulged in
lawful sports and pastimes as of right, and either –
(a) continue to do so, or
(b) have ceased to do so for not more than such period
as may be prescribed, or determined in accordance
with prescribed provisions.
(1B) If regulations made for the purposes of paragraph (b)
of sub-section (1A) of this section provide for the
period mentioned in that paragraph to come to an end
unless prescribed steps are taken, the regulations may
also require registration authorities to make available
in accordance with the regulations, on payment of any
prescribed fee, information relating to the taking of
any such steps.” (emphasis added)
The background to these amendments is set out in the
SALS paper (at paras 1.4–1.7). It was also pointed out in
the paper that the new legislative concepts might prove
difficult to apply. “Significant number” has been held to
refer to use signifying that the land is “in general use by the
local community for informal recreation, rather than
occasional use by individuals as trespassers” (R v Staffordshire
County Council, ex parte McAlpine Homes Ltd, 17 January
2002, per Sullivan J at para 71). This is helpful, but does
not assist in the definition of “neighbourhood”, a
deliberately looser term than “locality” (an area known to
law – see MoD v Wiltshire County Council (1995) Ch 931 at
937c) but which nevertheless still has to be “within a
locality”.
For this statutory requirement to have any meaning,
there must be some functional and geographical link, but 25
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such a reading is difficult to reconcile with the advice in
DETR Circular 04/2001 Countryside and Rights of Way
Act 2000 (para 80), to the effect that: “the implications of
this are that the commons registration authority will need
to be satisfied only that a significant number of local
inhabitants have used the land in a qualifying manner. Use
by people not from the locality will therefore be
irrelevant”. That guidance is perhaps a pre-echo of the
proposal in the Common Land Policy Statement 2002
(para 45) that:
“evidence of a clear pattern of public use of an area of land
should suffice to qualify land for potential registration as a
green, without a requirement to show (as at present) that it
emanates predominantly from one specified locality or group”.
The statements as to the law in the two documents,
however, are inconsistent and highlight the current
uncertainty.
Another difficulty about the amended definition is that it
could lead to a situation where local users have been
“significant” in the Staffordshire sense, but in the minority
relative to the total number of users of the land, with the
result (if the view were taken that registration of a Class C
green does indeed confer rights – the central problem of
the 1965 Act to which I have referred) that the minority
could exclude the majority. This is clearly not the
Government’s wish. The policy statement says: “We shall
… look to ensure that the general public has a right of
access to all greens once they have been established” (para
51).
Such policy aspirations are entirely understandable, but
it should be noted how far we are now straying from the
concept of particular, exclusive rights based on local
custom. The piecemeal approach is inherently problematic
because, as Carnwath J said in Steed, one must keep in
mind that the statutory test is a single one and that its
individual elements “take colour” from each other. The
separate treatment of parts of the test in Sunningwell and
the CROW amendment raises as many anomalies and
questions as it answers. The SALS paper concluded (at para
1.11):
“It seems to us that there are two main reasons for the
difficulties and lack of certainty surrounding the law. These
are firstly the incomplete and piecemeal nature of the
legislation and secondly the problems of trying to apply an
antiquated form of land use control in our contemporary
society. The attempt to tackle the first merely throws into
clearer relief the second.”
While on the subject of piecemeal changes, the CROW
amendment has left hanging in mid air the question of
interruptions and the relevant date for determination.
More than two years have gone by since the CROW
amendment and no regulations have been made. It is quite
clear from the consultation paper and Hansard that the
objective was to make it easier for local people to prepare
a case for registration. Under the legislation as it now
stands there is at least a strong argument that the position
for applicants is actually worse because of the requirement
for continuing user.
REFORM
We can probably all agree both that reform is necessary
and, in the words of the foreword to the Common Land
Policy Statement, that “this is an extremely complex policy
area to deal with and there is no ‘quick fix’.” Thereafter, it
may be that opinions will divide and the choices to be
made about reform will ultimately be political ones.
We in the SALS Group, approaching the topic initially
via the route of the promised regulations pursuant to the
CROW amendment, found that the more we thought
about the system of new TVG registration the more
anomalous it appeared. It was obvious that the central
uncertainty about the effect of registration should be
resolved, but considering this led to questions about the
relationship of the qualifying evidence of user (both
geographical and the nature of lawful sports and pastimes)
to the effect of the resultant registration which were not
easily resolved. It seemed anomalous, for example, that
evidence of dog walking and bird watching by some
inhabitants might found a right for other inhabitants to
indulge in fox hunting over the land. Likewise, that while
the parish church would have a clear entitlement to use
land for activities, a “gathered church” of a non-Established
denomination or religion, with a building in the
neighbourhood, but drawing people form a wide area,
might not. Bearing in mind that, on the face of it, criminal
liability might attach to infringements of local rights, the
situation seemed anachronistic and unsatisfactory.
In addition, the registration process itself gives rise to
expense, delay and uncertainty for all involved, (thought it
must be admitted that it is often very enjoyable to take part
in the inevitable public inquiries). Many applications are
made once the town and country planning process has run
its course, perhaps through many stages, after considerable
private and public investment. An application is made as
the last resort by the locals to prevent development to
which they object, but which has been decided under town
and country planning legislation to be in the public
interest. A successful application will probably frustrate
such a project, whereas even one which fails might delay
permitted development for two or three years or more.
Taking all this into account, along with the anachronisms of
the law itself, the group concluded (at para 1.11):
“We have come to the unanimous view that there is no
justification for retaining the procedure. The interests of
communities in open space and recreation are adequately
protected by the planning system which, being a modern,
comprehensive statutory code, is better suited to achieving
outcomes which are in the public interest.”26
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TVG’s should be defined for all purposes simply as “land
which has been registered as such”. Awkward questions
about the status of land in respect of which there had been
the requisite use but no registration could no longer arise.
Under the current law, as we have seen, this is an untested
question of some significance both to would-be developers
and local inhabitants. Our proposed definition would also
resolve some of the doubts about the applicability of old
regulatory legislation to Class C greens.
Since the Government in its policy documents states
that user by the public should become relevant to
registration and be secured by it, seemingly the policy
justification is not based on anything intrinsic to TVG
rights, rather on general public open space grounds. If the
proposals in the Common Land Policy Statement were
enacted, Class C TVGs would, essentially, be public open
space rather than areas of land subject to a particular local
custom which is “certain and reasonable” (per Sir George
Jessel MR in Hammerton v Honey and held to apply to Class
C greens by Pill LJ in Steed (CA) at p111).
In the event that the system of registering “new” TVGs
were to be kept, the SALS Paper suggested a number of
reforms, some of which would tidy up procedural
uncertainties, such as the amendment of applications and a
power for registration authorities to reject an application
which is obviously hopeless on the merits without going
through all the statutory procedures of advertisement and
consultation.
In an attempt to strike a reasonable balance between the
need for local people to have time to prepare an
application and the need for landowners and others to
achieve certainty about the status of land before investing
time and money in its development, we suggested a new
procedure. It would work as follows. A landowner desiring
to flush out any potential TVG application could erect
notices on the land asserting that it is not a TVG and either
banning entry or permitting it for the time being. There
would then be a period within which any other person
could serve notice on the Registration Authority indicating
provisional objection to the landowner’s notice. Time
would be “frozen” for a period to enable the locals to
obtain advice/gather evidence with a view to deciding
whether or not to make an application (see the SALS
report, paras 3.5–3.10 for full details including suggested
statutory wordings).
The other area which we suggested needed
consideration was that of de-registration. There is no
provision for de-registration as such unless the land ceases
to be TVG. The 1965 Act does not define the
circumstances in which land can cease to be TVG, although
such a result is contemplated in other legislation. It is
therefore unclear whether cessation is confined to those
statutory instances or whether it can come about by other
means, such as long cessation of use or incompatible
intervening events. This uncertainty both in its own right
and coupled with that surrounding the relevant date of
assessment for registration purposes, is a further real
difficulty. (For example, it might be held, in the absence of
the new regulations, that the relevant date was that of the
application, but in the meantime, in advance of any inquiry
or court ruling, an owner could have built on the land or
invited user by the general public. Would he, in the event
of a registration being made, be entitled to an immediate
amendment?)
Some provision should be made for de-registration in
limited circumstances, perhaps along the lines of the
Common Land Policy Statement proposal for commons:
“small isolated pockets of common no longer of much use
or value to anyone, and preserving some scope for putting
land to better public use in future in circumstances where
land exchange or compulsory purchase orders might not
be possible or appropriate” (see para 8).
There is another procedural issue which deserves
consideration. It has become a widespread practice to hold
a non-statutory inquiry before an independent person,
usually a barrister, who then reports to the registration
authority. Given that the number of barristers who
specialise in this area is fairly small, it is not unusual for one
of them to be sitting as “inspector” on one case, then
appearing as advocate in another. Apart from the fact that
there is the scope for conflicting decisions, these changes
of role can be awkward. If the system is to remain, it has
been suggested that there may be a case for appointing
TVG “commissioners” or asking the Planning Inspectorate
to undertake the inquisitorial role whether on behalf of
registration authorities and reporting to them or having
jurisdiction themselves to determine applications.
Morag Ellis
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The report New Town and Village Greens – Proposals for Law Reform was
prepared by a sub-group of the SALS Planning and Environmental
Law Reform Working Group chaired by the author.
